This paper empirically investigates how the intensity of product market competition a¤ects the cost of debt. Using a large sample of loans to publicly traded US manufacturing …rms, I provide evidence that an intensi…cation of product market competition among …rms signi…cantly increases the cost of bank loans. The analysis reveals that the e¤ect is strongest in industries with high illiquidity and speci…city of assets. This …nd-ing indicates that the liquidation value of assets is an important channel through which competition a¤ects the cost of debt. Moreover, I …nd that loans to …rms that operate in more competitive industries contain more covenants restricting the …rms'…nancing and dividend policies. Overall, the results suggest that banks explicitly take into account the risk arising from product market competition when pricing and designing debt contracts. 
I Introduction
High costs of debt can threaten …rms'survival. The recent …nancial crisis provides evidence for this fact and emphasizes the vital role of bank debt for …rms'operations. Besides this negative shock to the …nancial industry, …rms are also facing a signi…cant intensi…cation of product market competition. The past two decades have witnessed a widespread globalization and deregulation of economic activities that led to substantial changes in the competitive con…guration of industries. Surprisingly, the economic link between product market competition and the pricing and design of …nancial contracts has so far remained unexplored.
1 This paper aims to …ll this gap by empirically investigating the cross-sectional relation between the intensity of product market competition and the cost of debt. Using a sample of loan contracts issued to publicly traded US manufacturing …rms, I provide strong evidence that a more intense product market competition increases the cost of debt and reduces …rms' …nancial ‡exibility.
The economic mechanism relating product market competition and the cost of debt is as follows. Firms make operating decisions that may a¤ect the riskiness of their cash ‡ows.
These operating decisions arise from an equilibrium in the product market that potentially re ‡ects strategic interactions among market participants. For instance, companies must decide on a competition strategy and invest accordingly. Clearly, this decision critically depends on the industry structure and on the rivals'behavior. Alternatively, new competitors can enter an industry and increase the pressure on product prices. As a consequence, the product prices may decrease. Hence, an intensi…cation of product market competition may decrease pro…t margins and increase …rms'probability of default and the cost of debt. By contrast, if competition reduces agency problems and acts as a substitute for corporate governance, it may actually reduce the cost of debt. Moreover, a larger number of competitors in an industry raises the likelihood that a defaulted …rm's assets can be sold at high prices, increasing …rms'liquidation value of assets and hence reducing the cost of debt. However, if an industry has a high concentration of speci…c and illiquid assets, industry peers may not be able to acquire the defaulted …rm's assets. The banks'loss given default is higher in this case, increasing the cost of debt.
Overall, theory suggests that product market competition may have both positive and negative e¤ects on the cost of debt. To shed light on the potential economic mechanisms relating industry structure to …nancial contracts, this paper empirically explores the link between the intensity of product market competition and the cost of bank loans. More precisely, I argue that the intensity of product market competition a¤ects the cost of debt.
I further argue that banks also adjust loan contracts along non-pricing dimensions. In particular, they impose tighter restrictions on the …nancing and dividend policy of …rms by including covenants in the debt contracts.
To test these hypotheses, I build a large sample of loans to publicly traded US manufacturing …rms over the years 1995 to 2007 and study the impact of the intensity of product market competition on expected loan spreads. I proxy for the intensity of product market competition with two measures. First, I use the Her…ndahl-Hirschman Index provided by the US Census of Manufacturers. 2 Consistent with the idea that product market competition relates to …nancial contracting, I …nd strong evidence that banks charge higher loan spreads for loans to …rms in more competitive industries. Speci…cally, a one standard deviation increase in product market competition increases loan spreads by about 13 basis points for an average loan in my sample. This di¤erence translates into an additional cost of debt of USD 440'000 per year. In the estimations, I control for other determinants of loan spreads, including …rm-speci…c and loan-speci…c controls, macroeconomic conditions, and time and industry e¤ects.
Second, in order to mitigate endogeneity concerns that …nancing choices impact industry structure, I follow Frésard (2009) and take advantage of exogenous reductions of industry-2 This is a widely used, independent and reasonably timely measure of industry concentration that the Department of Justice and other regulatory agencies use to set and enforce competition policy. In a recent article, Ali, Klasa, and Yeung (2009) provide evidence that the Her…ndahl-Hirschman Index provided by the US Census of Manufacturers is a better proxy for the intensity of product market competition than concenration ratios only based on COMPUSTAT data.
level import tari¤s as a proxy for the intensi…cation of product market competition. The idea is that the reduction of trade barriers facilitates the penetration of foreign rivals into local markets and triggers an intensi…cation of …rms' competitive environment [Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006) ]. In line with this argument, I …nd that a reduction of import tari¤s increases the expected loan spreads by 21 basis points after controlling for other determinants loan spreads.
To demonstrate the robustness of the results, I estimate additional versions of the baseline speci…cation and control for alternative explanations. More speci…cally, I control for …rms' governance structure, for the expected default frequency and asset volatility, for industry's asset illiquidity, for the …rms'market share, for …rms'diversi…cation, and for self-selection.
Across all of these speci…cations, I uncover a substantial positive relation between the intensity of product market competition and loan spreads. These …ndings corroborate the main result and cast doubt on potential alternative explanations for my …ndings. Importantly, the results suggest that competition risk is a source of uncertainty that banks price.
Next, I explore in more detail the potential channels through which product market competition may a¤ect loan spreads. In particular, I examine how …rms'probability of default, and industry's asset speci…city and illiquidity (proxy for …rms'liquidation value of assets), change the impact of product market competition on loan spreads. Surprisingly, I …nd that product market competition has the strongest impact for …rms with a low probability of default. Moreover, and consistent with theoretical models that predict a connection between asset liquidity and …nancing choices [Shleifer and Vishny (1992) ; Myers and Rajan (1998) ; Morellec (2001) ], I …nd that an industry's asset speci…city and illiquidity magnify the e¤ect of product market competition on loan spreads. These …ndings lend support to the idea that competition risk impacts the cost of debt through a channel that relates to …rms'liquidation value of assets.
Finally, I exploit the non-pricing information about bank loans in my sample to explore the relation between the intensity of product market competition and loan covenants. Since cash ‡ows in more competitive industries tend to be more risky [Gaspar and Massa (2006) contracting. As such, I provide evidence that banks rationally take into account the industry structure and product market competition when pricing and designing …nancial contracts.
Second, my study contributes to the literature analyzing the determinants of loan contracts. 3 Recent empirical research devotes much e¤ort to studying the determinants of loan contracts along pricing and non-pricing dimensions. These papers investigate how loan contracts are a¤ected by …rm and risk characteristics [Strahan (1999) ; Bradley and Roberts (2004) ], the level of creditor protection [Bae and Goyal (2009); Qian and Strahan (2008) ], bankruptcy codes [Davydenko and Franks (2008) ], asset liquidation values [Benmelech, Garmaise, and Moskowitz (2005) ], corporate governance [Chava, Livdan, and Purnanandam 3 The rationale for focusing on bank loans is two-fold. The …rst rationale emanates from banks'economic importance. Banks are the dominant suppliers of external …nance for …rms. Second, bank loans provide multi-dimensional information about debt and therefore allow to investigate the e¤ect of product market competition on loan contracts along various dimensions.
(2009); Waisman (2009) ], accounting quality [Bharath, Sunder, and Sunder (2008) ], and corporate mis-reporting [Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008) ]. Although these studies shed light on important determinants of …nancial contracts, my paper is the …rst to provide systematic evidence on how the intensity of product market competition in ‡uences loan spreads and the covenant structure of loans.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section develops the main hypotheses.
Section III describes the empirical implementation, identi…cation, and the sample. Section IV presents the main results. Section V characterizes potential channels through which product market competition impacts the cost of debt. Section VI analyzes the e¤ect of product market competition on non-pricing loan characteristics. Section VII concludes.
II Hypotheses
Banks face several questions when they provide capital to …rms and decide how to price loans. Two central questions are: First, what is the likelihood that a …rm defaults while a loan is active? Second, how much of the loan face value can be recovered if a …rm defaults?
As such, the risk premium on debt is primarily a function of …rms' probability of default and the loss that banks incur when a …rm defaults:
4 Risk premium on debt = Probability of default Loss given default Indeed, recent research documents that …rms pay higher loan spreads when the probability of default is high [Strahan (1999) ; Bradley and Roberts (2004) ]. Furthermore, Benmelech, Garmaise, and Moskowitz (2005) provide evidence that the liquidation value of assets is an important determinant of the risk premium on debt. More speci…cally, they show that a lower redeployability of …rms'assets (higher loss given default) increases the cost of debt.
Product market competition may therefore a¤ect the risk premium on debt mainly through two distinct channels. The …rst channel is the …rms' probability of default. An intensi…cation of product market competition may decrease pro…t margins and thus increase …rms'probability of default. 5 Hence, an intensi…cation of product market competition increases …rms' cost of debt primarily because it increases …rms' probability of default. By contrast, an intensi…cation of product market competition may reduce managerial slack [Hart (1983) ], increase …rms'operational e¢ ciency, and improve corporate governance. Consistent with this conjecture, Guadalupe and Perez-Gonzales (2006) …nd that the intensity of product market competition correlates negatively with private bene…ts of control. In a similar spirit, Giroud and Mueller (2008) argue that …rms bene…t relatively more from good governance when lack of competitive pressure fails to enforce discipline on managers. They document that good corporate governance only a¤ects stock returns in concentrated industries. In competitive industries, however, the positive e¤ect of corporate governance on stock returns disappears [Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) ]. In this case, corporate governance and product market competition may act as substitutes. By implication, an intensi…cation of product market competition may reduce …rms'cost of debt because the disciplining forces of competition reduce agency and governance problems within …rms.
The second channel is the banks'loss given …rms'default. The impact of product market competition on the risk premium on debt through this channel is ambiguous. Given a …rm's default, a larger number of competitors increases the chances that the defaulted …rm's assets can be sold at a high price. In this case, an intensi…cation of product market competition decreases the loss given …rms'default and hence may reduce the risk premium on debt. By contrast, industry peers of defaulted …rms and potential buyers of assets may themselves be in distress. This illiquidity may lead to asset sales at prices below value in best use and to an increase of creditors'loss given default [Shleifer and Vishny (1992) ]. Hence, in industries with highly illiquid and speci…c assets, an intensi…cation of product market competition may increase the risk premium on debt.
This discussion shows that the strategic interactions among …rms within industries have implications for the …rms' cost of debt. I therefore state the following hypothesis. Other things equal:
H1. The intensity of product market competition a¤ects the cost of debt.
The e¤ect may go primarily through the …rms'probability of default and the liquidation value of assets. In my empirical analysis, I identify the magnitude of the e¤ect and the channel through which the e¤ect operates.
The intensity of product market competition may not only impact …nancial contracts along the pricing dimension, but also along non-pricing dimensions. For instance, Gârleanu and Zwiebel (2009) show that covenants should be stricter in …rms and industries where cash ‡ows are volatile and uncertain, and loser in industries where they are stable and predictable.
They argue that volatile cash ‡ows are likely to be related to asymmetric information, and that covenants may mitigate asset substitution. 6 Cash ‡ows in more competitive industries are more volatile and uncertain than cash ‡ows in concentrated industries [Raith (2003) ; Gaspar and Massa (2006) ; Irvine and Ponti¤ (2009)] . A direct implication of their analysis is therefore that the intensity of product market competition increases the likelihood of covenants in loan contracts restricting the …nancing and dividend policies of …rms. I summarize this idea in the following hypothesis. Other things equal:
H2. An increase in the intensity of product market competition increases the likelihood that loans contain covenants.
Taken together, the discussion in this section suggests that the intensity of product market competition may impact the cost of bank loans and the presence of loan covenants.
While some papers provide evidence of a connection between product markets and …nancing decisions, they remain silent about the implications of product markets on …nancial contracts.
6 Consistent with this idea, Bradley and Roberts (2004) and Malitz (1986) …nd that the presence of debt covenants is more likely when the borrower is small, has high growth opportunities, or is highly levered.
They do not, however, consider the e¤ect of the intensity of product market competition.
In this paper, I take a step in that direction and empirically investigate whether and how the intensity of product market competition a¤ects loan spreads and covenants.
III Empirical Implementation and Data

A The Impact of Product Market Competition on Loan Spreads
To explore the relation between industry structure and the cost of debt, I examine the e¤ect of the intensity of product market competition on expected loan spreads. To do so, I follow Chava, Livdan, and Purnanandam (2009), and Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008) and specify the following baseline model,
where the subscripts i and t represent the …rm and the quarter at loan issue, respectively. Bureau reports these indexes measuring the degree of concentration in an industry every …ve years for manufacturing …rms. It is an independent and reasonably timely measure 7 I use the logarithm of the loan spreads because the loan spreads are positive and (potentially) large integer values. 8 In an earlier draft of this paper I used the excess price-cost margin as a proxy for the intensity of product market competition [Nickell (1996) ; Gaspar and Massa (2006) ; Morellec and Nikolov (2008) 
B Identi…cation Strategy
There are two main issues regarding the identi…cation of the e¤ect of product market competition on loan spreads. First, do I really capture the e¤ect of product market competition on loan spreads, or is it simply a spurious correlation? Second, product market competition may be jointly determined with …rms'…nancing choices [see, for instance, Brander and Lewis (1986) ; Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) ]. To address the second issue of endogeneity, I follow Frésard (2009) and use reductions of industry-level import tari¤s to estimate the e¤ect of product market competition on loan spreads. Reductions of import tari¤s decrease the cost of entering US product markets and therefore increase the competitive pressure on domestic producers. Since changes in tari¤s occur in di¤erent industries at di¤erent times, the panel structure of my data set allows me to exploit this variation and to identify the e¤ect of product competition on …nancial contracts. As such, I look at whether loans made after a reduction of import tari¤s have a higher cost compared to loans to …rms in industries which did not experience a reduction of import tari¤s, all else equal. Given the exogeneity of tari¤ reductions to …rms'…nancing decisions, these events represent a quasi-natural experiment and should help identify the causal e¤ect of product market competition on loan spreads and other loan characteristics [Frésard (2009) ]. Credit agreements, packages or deals, often consist of one or more loans or facilities.
Since most …rms enter into multiple loans at the same time, many deals consist of more than one loan. For instance, a deal or package can contain two loans: a term loan and a revolving line of credit. I drop all loans without borrower ID (GVKEY) and with no information on the pricing, the maturity, and the loan amount. Importantly, when merging the package level information with the quarterly CRSP-COMPUSTAT data, I assume that any new deal replaces an existing deal in every way. Finally, I also drop deals if they do not contain any information on …nancial covenants. 11 Financial covenants are restrictions placed on accounting variables and ratios that …rms must maintain while a loan is active. tari¤s, imports, exports, and domestic production compiled by Feenstra (1996) and Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott (2002) . This data is only available until 2001. I match the data with my sample by four-digit SIC codes and year. The match results in 116 four-digit SIC industries 11 I acknowledge that the data does not represent a random sample of bank loans, largely because LPC's data collection procedure is skewed towards bigger …rms. There is, however, no reason to believe why the sample selection should be any di¤erent for …rms of the same size in competitive industries versus …rms in concentrated industries. Moreover, given that the …rms in my sample are mostly large and established …rms, they are unlikely to have entered the industry recently because of competitive reasons. Finally, product market competition may a¤ect small …rms more severely. Thus, the results are likely to understate the …ndings compared with a random sample of bank loans. 12 More speci…cally, I require that a loan has a …nancial covenant restricting at least one of the following accounting variables: net worth, tangible net worth, capital expenditures, debt to EBITDA ratio, debt to tangible net worth ratio, interest coverage ratio, EBITDA, current ratio, quick ratio, …xed charge coverage, leverage, debt service coverage, senior debt to EBITDA ratio, cash interest coverage, senior leverage, debt to equity ratio, or the loan value. 
D Summary Statistics
I have an unbalanced loan-quarter panel data set and winsorize all ratios at the 1st and 99th
percentile to mitigate the impact of outliers. Panel A of Table I presents means, medians, and standard deviations for deal characteristics in my sample.
<INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE>
The cost of the bank borrowing, the loan spread, is the Dealscan data item all-in-spread drawn, which is the amount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR or LIBOR equivalent for each dollar drawn. This measure adds to the borrowing spread any annual fees paid to the bank group. Since I perform the analysis at deal level, the loan spread represents the average loan spread for each deal. In my sample, the average loan spread is 178 basis points over LIBOR and comparable to related studies [Bradley and Roberts (2004) ; Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008)]. The average deal maturity is approximately …ve years, the average deal amount USD 342 millions, and there are on average seven banks participating in a loan syndicate. The majority of loans in my sample is secured (66 percent) and contains restrictions for dividend payments (80 percent). Restrictions for capital expenditures (24 percent) and leverage (50 percent) are less frequent. Finally, there are on average 2.69 …nancial covenants in a deal, and the covenant index has an average value of 2.51. I construct the covenant index following Bradley and Roberts (2004) . This index aggregates covenants of four distinct groups (prepayment, …nancial, dividend, and secured) by adding the binary variables representing the presence of a covenant in the loan contract.
Panel B of Table I shows summary statistics for the borrower …rms in my sample. The average book leverage is 28 percent, the average market-to-book ratio is 1.47, and the mean asset volatility is 54 percent. Overall, my sample is comparable to the samples used in related studies [Chava and Roberts (2008); Chava, Livdan, and Purnanandam (2009) ].
Panel C of Table I presents summary statistics for the proxies of the intensity of product market competition in my sample. The average six-digit NAICS Census HHI is 0.072, with a minimum value of 0 and a maximum value of 0.3. A high value for the Census HHI indicates a high industry concentration, or equivalently, a low intensity of product market competition.
The Four-Firm ratio is the sum of the market shares of the four largest …rms in terms of market shares in a six-digit NAICS industry as de…ned by the Census of Manufacturers.
The Four-Firm Ratio has an average value of 41 percent and a median value of 41 percent.
The numbers for the Census HHI and the Four-Firm Ratio are comparable to statistics of related studies using the four-digit SIC industry classi…cation [Ali, Klasa, and Yeung (2009) ].
The average number of …rms in a six-digit NAICS industry is substantially larger when the counting includes private …rms (810 …rms) compared to only counting COMPUSTAT …rms (29 …rms).
Next, Panel D of Table I Finally, Panel E of Table I shows the pairwise correlation coe¢ cients between the proxies for the intensity of product market competition and the loan spread. The loan spread correlates negatively with the Census HHI and the Four-Firm Ratio, and positively with the number of …rms per industry. This suggests that …rms operating in more competitive industries pay, on average, higher loan spreads. teristics between loans issued to …rms operating in competitive environments compared to loans issued to …rms operating in concentrated industries. For instance, the median loan spread is 175 basis points for …rms that operate in a competitive environment. By contrast, the median loan spread is only 150 basis points for …rms in industries with low competition.
E Di¤erences in Loan Characteristics Across Subsamples
The di¤erence in medians of 25 basis points is statistically and economically signi…cant. For a median loan size of USD 120 millions, this di¤erence translates into an additional cost of debt of USD 300'000 per year. The di¤erence in means is 13 basis points and hence a little bit smaller than for loan spread medians, but still statistically signi…cant.
<INSERT TABLE II ABOUT HERE>
Similarly, there are signi…cant di¤erences in the frequency of covenants between loans to …rms operating in competitive and concentrated industries. More speci…cally, …rms in more competitive industries face more …nancial covenants, dividend restrictions, and security provisions than …rms in concentrated industries. The average covenant index and the average number of …nancial covenants are signi…cantly higher for …rms in the high competition group.
Likewise, the likelihood that a loan contains dividend restrictions and security provisions is signi…cantly higher for loans issued to …rms operating in competitive industries. These observations are in line with the hypothesis that loans to …rms in more competitive industries contain more and tighter covenants.
As expected, the average total assets of …rms are much larger in concentrated industries (USD 3,043 millions) than in competitive industries (USD 1,007 millions). Moreover, the average loan amount is larger in concentrated industries (USD 474 millions) than in competitive industries (USD 213 millions). The di¤erence is statistically signi…cant. The average and median loan amount to total assets, however, is larger in competitive industries. Furthermore, there are not large di¤erences between the high and low competition group for the loan maturity, …nancial leverage, and market-to-book ratio. This suggests that banks take into account product market competition by charging a higher loan spread and by including covenants, but not by decreasing the loan amount and maturity. A similar picture emerges when I make terciles based on the Four-Firm Ratio (Panel B of Table II) . Notably, the loan spread is signi…cantly higher for …rms operating in competitive industries compared to …rms operating in more concentrated industries. Furthermore, the likelihood of containing covenants is signi…cantly larger for loans to …rms in more competitive industries. Finally, the likelihood of having a credit rating is much larger for …rms in concentrated industries. Overall, this analysis across subgroups shows that, on average, loans to …rms in more competitive industries have higher loan spreads and contain more restrictions in the form of covenants.
IV Product Market Competition and Loan Spreads A The Real E¤ects of Product Market Competition
I study the impact of the intensity of product market competition on the cost of debt by estimating equation 1. To draw meaningful inferences, I control for …rm characteristics, loan features, and macroeconomic conditions that may in ‡uence a bank's decision to charge a higher or lower loan spread. In this section, I present the main results using the Census HHI and the Four-Firm ratio as proxies for the intensity product market competition. In later sections, I attempt to provide more evidence in support of a causal link between product market competition and loan spreads using reductions of import tari¤s as a quasi-natural experiment.
Table III displays the estimates of the e¤ect of product market competition on loan spreads. In column 1, the coe¢ cient on Census HHI is signi…cantly negative at the one percent con…dence level, suggesting that the intensity of product market competition has a positive e¤ect on loan spreads. This result is consistent with hypothesis 1. The e¤ect is economically large. All else equal, a one standard deviation increase in product market competition increases …nancing costs by 7 percent, which is equivalent to 13 basis points (signi…cant at 1 percent). 13 This order of magnitude is similar to the e¤ect of changes in shareholders'rights on loan spreads [Chava, Livdan, and Purnanandam (2009)] . In columns 2 and 3, I add additional control variables and include industry, loan type, loan purpose, and year-quarter …xed-e¤ects. Although the coe¢ cient on Census HHI decreases slightly, it remains signi…cant at the 1 percent con…dence level, supporting the idea that …rms in more competitive industries have higher costs of debt.
<INSERT better terms. I use the market-to-book ratio to proxy for …rms'growth opportunities. The marginally negative coe¢ cient may be due to the fact that the market-to-book value represents the additional value over book assets that debt holders can access in the event of default [Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008) ]. I also control for leverage, pro…tability, tangibility, cash ‡ow volatility, and Altman's zscore. The signs of the estimated coe¢ cients are in line with related studies [Chava, Livdan, and Purnanandam (2009); Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008) ].
Overall, the results suggest that small, volatile, highly levered …rms with few tangible assets and few growth opportunities have higher costs of bank …nancing.
Further, I also control for macroeconomic conditions. More speci…cally, I include the credit and term spread as additional control variables. The credit spread is the di¤erence between the yields of BAA and AAA corporate bonds, and the term spread is the di¤erence between yields of 10-year Treasury bonds and 3-months T-Bills. Credit spreads and loan spreads are positively related, suggesting that the individual loan rate re ‡ects market wide default risk. The term and loan spread also relate positively, indicating that banks do not take into account good economic prospects when they decide on the loan rate.
Finally, I also control for the size of the loan as the proportion of …rms'assets and for the maturity of the loan. The loan amount relates positively and the loan maturity negatively to loan spreads. A potential explanation for the negative coe¢ cient on loan maturity could be that banks grant shorter maturity loans to riskier …rms [Strahan (1999) ]. I also include loan type and loan purpose dummies because banks may price loans with di¤erent types and purposes di¤erently. In addition, I include Fama-French industry dummies to control for the potential di¤erences in risks and debt pricing across industries. Finally, I include year-quarter …xed-e¤ects to capture unobserved time e¤ects that may in ‡uence the pricing of bank loans.
To give additional support for these results, I use an alternative proxy for the intensity of product market competition. I use the Four-Firm Ratio, which is the sum of the market shares of the four largest …rms in terms of market shares in a six-digit NAICS industry as de…ned by the Census of Manufacturers. The higher is the Four-Firm Ratio, the more concentrated is an industry. Therefore, a low Four-Firm Ratio for an industry indicates that the industry is more competitive. Columns 4 through 6 show the baseline estimation results using the lagged Four-Firm Ratio as the proxy for product market competition. In all three columns, the estimated coe¢ cient on the Four-Firm Ratio is negative and signi…cant. The economic magnitude of the e¤ect similar to the e¤ect using the Census HHI. These results corroborate the …ndings using the Census HHI and suggest that a more intense product market competition increases the cost of bank loans.
To reinforce the interpretation of the results, Table IV <INSERT As expected, the coe¢ cients on both variables, EDF and asset volatility, are positive and signi…cant, suggesting that …rms with higher default risk and more volatile assets pay higher spreads for bank loans. The coe¢ cient on Census HII remains virtually unchanged and is signi…cantly negative. It seems that traditional measures of default risk (Altman's zscore, leverage, EDF, asset volatility) do not subsume the risk of competition. The intensity of product market competition continues to have a signi…cantly positive e¤ect on the cost of debt.
The loss given …rms'default is an important determinant of the risk premium on debt.
In all speci…cations, I therefore include net PPE as a proxy for …rms'tangible assets. This measure should partly capture banks' loss given default. In particular, a lower tangibility of the …rm's assets may decrease the expected recovery rates for creditors and increase the cost of debt. Moreover, depending on the security provisions contained in debt contracts, asset liquidity may increase or decrease the cost of debt. Hence, asset liquidity may play a potentially important role for capital structure and for the pricing of debt [Shleifer and Vishny (1992) ; Morellec (2001) ; Myers and Rajan (1998) ]. In column 3, I thus include industry's asset illiquidity as an additional control variable. I follow Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan (2006) and use the inverse of the quick ratio (cash and short term investments plus receivables divided by current liabilities) as a proxy for illiquidity. In each calendar year and three-digit NAICS industry, I compute the median industry's asset illiquidity. Next, I de…ne a dummy variable (Asset Illiquidity) that equals one if the industry's illiquidity is above the median, and zero otherwise. The coe¢ cient on the Census HHI remains virtually unchanged and is signi…cantly negative when I include this additional control variable. Interestingly, the coe¢ cient on Asset Illiquidity is negative and signi…cant. This suggests that a higher asset illiquidity decreases the cost of debt.
Column 4 contains proxies for the …rms'default probability and for the asset illiquidity in the same speci…cation. Again, the coe¢ cient on the Census HHI remains negative and signi…cant, despite these additional control variables. This …nding supports hypothesis 1 and suggests that the intensity of product market competition increases the cost of debt. Below I explore in more detail two potential channels through which competition may a¤ect the cost of debt.
Next, in column 5 of Table IV , I include lagged market share as an additional control variable. Firms with larger market shares may be industry leaders and have easier access to …nancing, be more prone to withstand …erce product market competition, and hence obtain loans at more favorable conditions than …rms with small market shares (followers). I measure market share as the proportion of …rm i's sales to total industry sales in the six-digit NAICS industry. The coe¢ cient on market share is negative and insigni…cant, suggesting that a large market share is not an important determinant of the loan spread. The coe¢ cient on Census HHI remains negative and statistically and economically signi…cant.
Further, in column 6 of Table IV, I control with a dummy variable whether or not a …rm is diversi…ed. The dummy variable equals one if a …rm operates in more than on segment, and zero otherwise. More diversi…ed …rms may have easier access to …nancing because of less volatile cash ‡ows and less exposure to negative shocks to their core business. Indeed, the coe¢ cient on diversi…cation is negative and signi…cant, suggesting that more diversi…ed …rms have, on average, lower …nancing costs. The coe¢ cient on the Census HHI remains, however, negative and statistically signi…cant.
Finally, in column 7 of Column 7 shows that correcting for self-selection has no bearing on the conclusion. The coe¢ cient on the Census HHI is still negative and signi…cant at the 1 percent level. I also report the inverse Mills-ratio, which can be viewed as a control for and test for the signi…cance of private information [Li and Prabhala (2007)]. Private information held by the issuer or the bank could a¤ect the choices made by …rms. If such information has value, it a¤ects the prices at which …rms can raise debt. In column 6, the inverse Mills-ratio is positive and signi…cant. This suggests that private information possessed ex-ante has a positive e¤ect on debt prices ex-post. The main conclusion that the intensity of product market competition relates positively and signi…cantly to loan spreads, however, remains unchanged.
In addition, I re-estimate the baseline equation 1 for subsamples based on the sample period. I also include lagged capital expenditures as a control for industry entry costs, and real GDP growth as an additional control for the state of the economy. Finally, I estimate median regressions. These additional estimations do not change my conclusion, and the intensity of product market competition continues to relate positively and signi…cantly to loan spreads.
Overall, the results in this section suggest that …rms in more competitive industries have a higher cost of debt. This e¤ect of competition is robust to alternative explanations and estimation techniques, and suggests that competition risk is a separate factor a¤ecting the pricing of corporate debt.
B The E¤ect of Reductions of Industry-Level Import Tari¤s
The preceding section has shown that a more intense product market competition relates to a higher cost of debt. To examine the robustness of this result, I follow Frésard (2009) and examine the response of loan spreads to unexpected variations of industry-level import tari¤s. Using product-level U.S. import data compiled by Feenstra (1996) 15 More speci…cally, a tari¤ reduction occurs in a speci…c industry-year when a negative change in the tari¤ rate is 2 or 2.5 times larger than its median or mean change.
I exclude tari¤ reductions that are followed by equivalently large increases in tari¤s over the two subsequent years in order to make sure that the tari¤ reductions re ‡ect non-transitory changes in the competitive environment (see Frésard (2009) for a more detailed discussion on the data and method).
I then estimate equation 1 and I replace the Census HHI proxy for the intensity of product market competition with a dummy variable that equals one if an industry has experienced a large tari¤ reduction in the previous year and zero otherwise. Importantly, the coe¢ cient on this dummy variable identi…es the e¤ect of an intensi…cation of competition on the pricing of loans, since tari¤ reductions occur in di¤erent industries at di¤erent times. As a result, and consistent with the prediction, we should observe a positive and signi…cant e¤ect of tari¤ reductions on the pricing of loans. Table V presents the estimation results using various speci…cations for the magnitude of the tari¤ reduction (2 and 2.5 times the median and mean change in tari¤s).
<INSERT The estimation results in Table V show that the estimates of the dummy variables are positive and signi…cant at the 1 or 5 percent level across the four measures of tari¤ reductions.
For instance, column 1 of Table V shows the results for the dummy variable equal to one if the decrease in tari¤s is 2 times larger than its median change (dTARIFF > 2 median).
The estimated coe¢ cient has a value of 0.108 and suggests that loan spreads increase by almost 11 percent, or 21 basis points, after a tari¤ reduction. This e¤ect is statistically signi…cant and economically large. The e¤ect is almost identical for the dummy variable equal to one if the decrease in tari¤ rates is 2.5 times larger than its median change (column 2). In columns 3 and 4 I report the results for dummy variables that I construct using mean changes in industry tari¤s. Both coe¢ cient estimates are positive and signi…cant. The estimate in column 4 of Table V suggests that loan spreads increase by 20 basis points after a tari¤ reduction larger than 2.5 times its mean value (dTARIFF > 2.5 mean). These results strongly support the idea that an intensi…cation of product market competition causes the cost of debt to rise.
V Product Market Competition and Loan Spread: Potential Channels
To shed further light on the relation between the intensity of product market competition and the cost of debt, I investigate through which channel competition risk may a¤ect loan spreads. More speci…cally, I explore whether the impact of the intensity of product market competition on loan spreads depends on the …rms'probability of default and on the …rms' liquidation value of assets.
A The Probability of Default Channel
An increase in the intensity of product market competition may on one hand increase the risk premium on debt because it reduces …rms' pro…t margins and increases …rms' probability of default. On the other hand, competition may act as a disciplining force for managers and as a substitute for good corporate governance. In this case, an increase in the intensity of product market competition may reduce the …rms' probability of default and the risk premium on the …rms'debt.
To examine whether the e¤ect of the intensity of product market competition depends on the …rms'probability of default, I interact the Census HHI variable with …rms'EDF and asset volatility. 16 Table VI reports the estimation results.
<INSERT TABLE VII ABOUT HERE> Column 1 contains the estimation results with the EDF as an additional control variable.
As expected, the coe¢ cient on EDF is signi…cantly positive. In column 2, I interact the Census HHI variable with the EDF. The coe¢ cient on the interaction term is positive and signi…cant, while the coe¢ cient on EDF is small and insigni…cant. For a given intensity of product market competition, an increase in EDF increases the cost of debt. Or to put it di¤erently, an increase in the intensity of product market competition increases the cost of debt strongest for …rms with a low EDF. This suggests that the probability of default does not reinforce the positive e¤ect of competition on the cost of debt. Note, however, that the inclusion of the interaction term between the Census HHI and the EDF has no bearing on the positive direct e¤ect of competition on the cost of debt. The coe¢ cient on the Census HHI is negative and signi…cant at the one percent con…dence level.
In column 3 I replace the EDF with the …rms'asset volatility as a control variable. Asset volatility has a positive and signi…cant e¤ect on the cost of debt. In column 4 I interact the Census HHI variable with asset volatility. The coe¢ cient on the interaction term is negative but insigni…cant. The e¤ect of asset volatility is still positive and signi…cant, while the coe¢ cient on the Census HHI remains negative and signi…cant.
Overall, the results in this section suggest that the probability of default is not the main channel through which the intensity of product market competition impacts the cost of debt. The positive e¤ect of product market competition on loan spreads seems to be most important for …rms with a low, and not high, probability of default.
B The Asset Liquidation Value Channel
A second potential channel through which product market competition may impact the cost of debt is through the liquidation value of …rms'assets (loss given default). In particular, a lower liquidation value of the …rms's assets decreases the expected recovery rates for creditors and may increase the cost of debt. Moreover, asset illiquidity and speci…city may play a potentially important role for capital structure and for the pricing of debt [Shleifer and Vishny (1992) ; Morellec (2001); Myers and Rajan (1998) ]. Consistent with this idea, Benmelech, Garmaise, and Moskowitz (2005) …nd that more redeployable assets receive loans with lower rates, using commercial zoning regulation to capture the redeployability of assets.
Similarly, Sibilkov (2009) To examine whether the e¤ect of the intensity of product market competition depends on the …rms'liquidation value, I interact the Census HHI variable with variables indicating whether or not an industry's assets are speci…c or illiquid. I measure asset illiquidity with the inverse of the quick ratio and de…ne the variable in Table IV . I follow Berger, Ofek, and Swary (1996) and Stromberg (2001) and use the book value of machinery and equipment divided by the book value of total assets as a proxy for asset speci…city. In each calendar year and industry (three-digit NAICS), I compute the median industry speci…city. Then, I
de…ne a dummy variable (Asset Speci…city) that equals one if the asset speci…city is above the industry median, and zero otherwise. Table VII shows the estimation results.
<INSERT TABLE VII ABOUT HERE>
In columns 2 and 4 of Table VII, the interaction term between the Census HHI and asset speci…city or illiquidity is negative and statistically signi…cant. These interaction results reveal that banks charge signi…cantly higher loan spreads to …rms operating in competitive industries with speci…c or illiquid assets. This …nding suggests that the positive e¤ect of the intensity of product market on the cost of debt is most important for industries with illiquid and speci…c assets. In columns 1 and 3, I include asset speci…city and illiquidity as additional control variables, but do not include the respective interaction terms. Interestingly, the coe¢ cients of the direct e¤ects of asset speci…city and illiquidity are negative. This suggests that a higher asset speci…city or illiquidity decreases the cost of debt. Note, however, that in these speci…cations the direct e¤ect of the Census HHI remains negative and statistically signi…cant at the one percent con…dence level (-1.209 in column 1, and -1.137 in column 3).
Overall, this analysis provides evidence that product market competition is especially important for the cost of debt in industries with speci…c and illiquid assets. Importantly, this …nding suggests that an intensi…cation of product market competition increases the cost of debt through a channel that relates to …rms'asset liquidation value.
VI Non-Pricing Loan Characteristics
If intense product market competition renders …rms'cash ‡ows more risky, banks may incorporate this risk into debt contracts by altering not only the loan spread but also other contract terms, such as the number of covenants, the collateral, and the syndicate size. In this section, I focus on how the intensity of product market competition impacts the total number of covenants, the collateral, and the size of the syndicate.
Theory suggests that loans to …rms in more competitive industries contain more restrictions on the …rms' …nancing and dividend policy. We should therefore observe that loans to …rms in more competitive industries contain more covenants, controlling for other factors that may correlate with covenants (hypothesis 2). Column 1 of Table VIII shows coe¢ cient estimates from poisson regressions and reveals that this is indeed the case. The dependent variable is the number of …nancial covenants. The coe¢ cient on the Census HHI is signi…-cantly negative. This …nding indicates that a higher intensity of product market competition relates to more …nancial covenants in loan contracts. Similarly, in column 2, the dependent variable is the covenant index as de…ned by Bradley and Roberts (2004) . Again, the coef…cient on the Census HHI is signi…cantly negative, suggesting that loan contracts to …rms in competitive industries contain more restrictions on …nancing and dividend policy than comparable …rms in concentrated industries.
<INSERT TABLE VIII ABOUT HERE>
Next, column 3 of Table VIII reports probit estimates in which the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the loan contract contains a restriction on dividend payments and zero otherwise. The Census HHI coe¢ cient is signi…cantly negative and translates into a an economically important marginal e¤ect of -0.58 in the probit model. This coe¢ cient suggests that the probability that a loan contract contains restrictions on dividend payments increases by approximately 14 percent when the intensity of product market competition increases by one standard deviation (signi…cant at 1 percent).
Furthermore, column 4 shows probit estimates in which the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the loan contract is secured and zero otherwise. Since security provisions relate directly to debt holders' cash ‡ows, we would expect that the coe¢ cient on the Census HHI is negative. Indeed, the coe¢ cient on the Census HHI is negative and statistically signi…cant. It seems therefore that the intensity of product market competition is a determinant of whether or not a loan is secured.
Finally, column 5 of Table VIII reveals that the intensity of product market competition a¤ects signi…cantly the number of lenders in the loan syndicate. An increase in the intensity of product market competition by one standard deviation decreases syndicate size by about 13 percent (signi…cant at 1 percent), which is equivalent to almost one lender. This result is economically large and consistent with the idea that …rms in more competitive industries need more intense monitoring, and that smaller syndicates may be better able at coping with loans to distressed …rms.
The estimated coe¢ cients on the control variables provide ambiguous evidence on the relation between syndicate size and loan spreads. On one hand, larger …rms have loans with more lenders, possibly because larger …rms need larger loans and more lenders to provide the capital. Leverage also correlates positively with the number of lenders, probably because lenders want to diversify their lender portfolio and decrease the credit risk. This is consistent with the diversi…cation motive of syndication. On the other hand, cash ‡ow volatility relates negatively to the syndicate size. Since …rms with more volatile cash ‡ows require closer monitoring, banks may forms smaller syndicates. This is consistent with the monitoring motive for syndication [Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) ]. Deal amount and maturity relate positively to the syndicate size. Banks form larger syndicates for larger and longer maturity loans.
Taken together, the results in Table VIII 
VII Conclusions
In this paper I empirically explore whether and through which channel the intensity of product market competition a¤ects the cost of debt. First, I provide evidence that banks charge signi…cantly higher loan spreads for loans to …rms operating in more competitive industries. In particular, by taking advantage of exogenous reductions of industry-level import tari¤s, I document an average increase in loans spreads of 21 basis points after reductions of import tari¤s. My …ndings are robust to alternative explanations, such as …rms' governance structure, …rms' probability of default, …rms' diversi…cation, and selfselection. The results suggest that banks take into account competition risk when they price loan contracts.
Second, I investigate through which channel the intensity of product market competi-tion impacts the cost of debt. My investigations reveal that the e¤ect of product market competition is strongest for …rms in industries with speci…c and illiquid assets. This …nding suggests that an important channel through which product market competition impacts the pricing of corporate debt is through the …rms'liquidation value.
Finally, I show that loans to …rms in competitive industries contain more …nancial covenants, dividend restrictions, and security provisions. Moreover, on average, loan syndicates are smaller for loans to …rms in more competitive industries. In sum, these results suggest that banks incorporate competition risk also along non-pricing dimensions.
My results emphasize the importance of taking into account the linkages between product and …nancial markets. As such, the …ndings point to interesting avenues for future research.
For instance, in recent papers Julio, Kim, and Weisbach (2008) and Erel, Julio, Kim, and Weisbach (2009) show that the security issuance depends on the business cycle. In the light of my results, the intensity of product market competition may be an important determinant of …rms'choices to issue equity, bank debt, or public debt. This table reports coe¢ cient estimates of regressions examining the e¤ect of the intensity of product market competition on loan spreads (equation 1). The dependent variable is the logarithm of the loan spread. I use the six-digit NAICS Her…ndahl-Hirschman Index provided by the Census of Manufacturers (Census HHI) as a proxy for the intensity of product market competition. EDF is the expected default frequency that I estimate using a Merton's structural model. Asset volatility is the volatility of the …rms' assets also estimated using a structural model. I de-mean all …rm-seci…c variables by their six-digit NAICS industry mean. I measure all independent variables as of the quarter prior to the loan start date. The sample period is from 1995 to 2007. Estimates followed by , and are statistically di¤erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signi…cance levels, respectively. I report the estimates'standard errors adjusted for within-…rm clustering in parentheses below the coe¢ cient estimates.
(1) (2) (3) This table reports coe¢ cient estimates of regressions examining the e¤ect of the intensity of product market competition on loan spreads (equation 1). The dependent variable is the logarithm of the loan spread. I use the six-digit NAICS Her…ndahl-Hirschman Index provided by the Census of Manufacturers (Census HHI) as a proxy for the intensity of product market competition. In each calendar year and industry (three-digit NAICS), I compute the industry's median asset speci…city and illiquidity. I then de…ne illiquidity (speci…city) as a dummy variable equal to one if the median industry illiquidity (speci…city) is above the median, and zero otherwise. I de-mean all …rm-seci…c variables by their six-digit NAICS industry mean. I measure all independent variables as of the quarter prior to the loan start date. The sample period is from 1995 to 2007. Estimates followed by , and are statistically di¤erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signi…cance levels, respectively. I report the estimates' standard errors adjusted for within-…rm clustering in parentheses below the coe¢ cient estimates.
(1) (2) (3) This table reports coe¢ cient estimates of regressions examining the e¤ect of the intensity of product market competition on non-pricing loan characteristics. I estimate the speci…cations in columns 1 and 2 with poisson regressions, the speci…cations in columns 3 and 4 with probit regressions, and speci…cation 5 with OLS. The dependent variables are the number of …nancial covenants (column 1); the covenant index constructed along the lines of Bradley and Roberts (2004) (column 2); a dummy variable equal to one if the loan contains restrictions on dividend payments and zero otherwise (column 3); a dummy variable equal to one if the loan is secured and zero otherwise (column 4); the logarithm of the number of lenders in the loan syndicate (column 5). In all speci…cations, I use the six-digit NAICS Her…ndahl-Hirschman Index provided by the Census of Manufacturers (Census HHI) as a proxy for the intensity of product market competition. I demean all …rm-seci…c variables by their six-digit NAICS industry mean. I measure all independent variables as of the quarter prior to the loan start date. The sample period is from 1995 to 2007. Estimates followed by , and are statistically di¤erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signi…cance levels, respectively. I report the estimates' standard errors adjusted for within-…rm clustering in parentheses below the coe¢ cient estimates.
(1) 
